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YOUNG V. AMERICAN MINI THEATRES, INC.: THE 
WAR ON NEIGHBORHOOD DETERIORATION LEAVES 
FIRST AMENDMENT CASUALTY 
Carol Rudnick Kirchick* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to 
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhib-
ited in the theaters of our choice."! With this statement, the Su-
preme Court in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,2 upheld a 
Detroit zoning ordinance that classified adult theaters and book-
stores based upon the substance of the material they sell. The 
Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Stevens, equated the 
level of protection afforded speech with its appeal to the public and 
upheld the ordinances, as non-violative of the First Amendment and 
the equal protection clause. 
In 1972, the City of Detroit promulgated ordinances which 
adopted a theory of inverse zoning.3 This plan required that various 
enterprises4 be separated throughout the community rather than 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
, 427 U.S. 50. 
3 American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1015 (6th Cir. 1975), reu'd sub 
nom. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). (Gribbs was mayor of 
Detroit at the time of the district court and circuit court suits. Since that time Coleman 
Young has been in the mayoral position). 
• DETROIT, MICH. ORDINANCE 742-G § 66.000 (1972). 66.000 Regulated Uses 
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized that there are some 
uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable 
operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are concentrated under 
certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Speci~l 
regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that these adverse effects will not contribute 
to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood. These special regula-
tions are itemized in this section. The primary control of regulation is for the purpose of 
preventing a concentration of these uses in anyone area (i.e. not more than two such uses 
101 
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concentrated in one area. Among those uses restricted were "adult" 
movie theaters and bookstores, although the specific adult material 
offered in these establishments had not been judicially declared 
obscene.5 These ordinances were amendments to a 1962 'Anti-Skid 
Row' ordinance, promulgated to prevent the deleterious effects 
thought to accompany certain adult entertainment businesses.8 The 
ordinances prohibited more than two such enterprises from being 
located within one thousand feet of one another and further re-
quired that adult theaters and adult bookstores not be located 
within five hundred feet of a residential area. The ordinances pro-
vided for waiver of the restrictions if the proposed use would not be 
contrary to the public interest and would not encourage the further 
development of a "skid-row" area. 7 
within one thousand feet of each other which would create such adverse effects). Uses 
subject to these controls are as follows: 
Adult Book Store, Adult Motion Picture Theater, Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater, 
Cabaret, Group "D" Cabaret, Establishment for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor for 
consumption on the premises, Hotels or motels, Pawnshops, Pool or billiard halls, Public 
lodging houses, Secondhand stores, Shoeshine parlors, Taxi dance halls. 
S Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957). The Supreme Court has established guidelines for determining whether 
material is obscene: 
1) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; 3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Supreme Court limited prosecution for the 
sale or exposure of obscene materials to those materials that depict "hard core" sexual 
conduct. [d. at 27. 
Unlike the situation in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Detroit 
zoning ordinances in American Mini did not provide for individualized determination of 
whether a particular movie or book was obscene. See note 94 infra. 
• 427 U.S. at 54. See note 4, supra, for the text of the 1972 amendments. 
1 DETROIT, MICH. ORDINANCE 742-G § 66.0101. Nov Section 66.0101. 
The Commission may waive this locational provision for Adult Book Stores, Adult Motion 
Picture Theaters, Adult Mini Motion Picture Theaters, Group "D" Cabarets, hotels or mo-
tels, pawnshops, pool or billiard halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoe shine 
parlors, or taxi dance halls if the following findings are made: 
a) That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or injurious to nearby 
properties, and that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be observed. 
b) That the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage the development of a "skid row" 
area. 
c) That the establishment of an additional regulated use in the area will not be contrary to 
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A number of "adult" establishments sought relief, claiming that 
the ordinances denied due process of law because they were void for 
vagueness and also that the ordinances violated the First Amend-
ment and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
They claimed that the ordinances classified theaters and bookstores 
as "adult" based solely on the content of the material displayed at 
such establishments, a classification repugnant to the freedoms pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 
The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court addressed the issues 
of vagueness, prior restraint on protected speech, and violations of 
the First Amendment and the equal protection clause. Three Jus-
tices concurred with Justice Stevens that the Detroit zoning scheme 
did not violate the equal protection clause since the city must be 
afforded an opportunity to experiment with methods to avoid neigh-
borhood deterioration. Justice Powell rested his concurrence on the 
traditionally wide latitude that courts have afforded to municipal 
zoning power. Additionally, Powell concluded that any burden im-
posed by the ordinances upon the First Amendment was permissibly 
incidental. . 
In analyzing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., this article 
first will examine the varying and often inconsistent bases upon 
which the Supreme Court has decided cases of discrimination based 
upon the content of speech. If such content based classifications are 
indeed identified by the court,8 the Court applies either one of two 
constitutional tests. The Court may determine whether the burden 
on speech, protected by the First Amendment, is an incidental by-
product of regulating specific non-speech conduct. On the other 
hand, the Court may apply the strict scrutiny test mandated by the 
equal protection clause. Under equal protection analysis; the Court 
will permit the classifications to stand only if it finds that a com-
pelling state interest is present. Second, the standard of equal pro-
tection invoked by Justice Stevens will be studied to determine 
whether the theater and bookstore owners were afforded adequate 
protection of the laws. 
Analysis of these issues will demonstrate that equal protection 
was the correct basis for decision in American Mini. It is submitted, 
any program of neighborhood conservation nor will it interfere with any program of urban 
renewal. 
d) That all applicable regulations of this Ordinance will be observed. 
• Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The Court in Lehman did not 
view a classification as one of content-discrimination. See text at notes 64-73 infra. 
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however, that the Supreme Court failed to recognize that its respon-
sibilities to safeguard speech from indirect censorship are the same 
for all types of speech, regardless of the Court's distaste for the 
content of that speech or the public's willingness "to march (their) 
sons and daughters off to war" for the right to view "x-rated" enter-
tainment. 
II. BACKGROUND.TO THE American Mini DECISION 
A. The Standards of Review as Applied to Discrimination of 
Speech Based Upon Content 
1. The Rationale of Equal Protection Review 
Traditionally, the Court has employed a two-tier standard of re-
view in equal protection scrutiny. Under the least protective level, 
a legislative classification is presumptively valid. The Court's in-
quiry ends upon a finding that the legislation could reasonably fur-
ther a legitimate state interest. Most often this "rational basis" tier 
is applied in cases of economic discrimination. The Court has invali-
dated an economic regulation under the rational basis scrutiny on 
only one occasion.' Under the strict tier of review, the state, rather 
than the complainant, carries the burden of justification. The 
stricter tier of equal protection is employed by the Court where 
"suspect" classifications are found or fundamental rights are in-
vaded. 1o The rights secured by the First Amendment are among 
those rights considered fundamental. ll Thus the state must show 
that the classification drawn is the least restrictive alternative to 
achieving the specific goal,l2 
Several commentators have chronicled the evolution of a third 
• Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), invalidated an economic regulation that specifically 
exempted American Express Co. from a prohibition on all companies selling money orders. 
Morey was expressly overruled in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). 
It Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-
Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071' (1974). "[T]his 
standard of review has been 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." [d. at 1080. Analysis of a 
legislative classification under strict scrutiny has been upheld only twice by the Supreme 
Court: Koretmatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81 (1943). 
Fundamental rights are any rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973). The 
Court has explicitly recognized classifications based upon race and alienage as suspect. Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1962) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alien-
age). 
II Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
,. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1122 (1969). 
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standard of equal protection scrutiny. It is seen as "more demand-
ing than the 'rational basis' of the lower tier, yet less exacting than 
'strict scrutiny' . . . [it] require[s] factual substantiation that 
these [legislative] ends are rationally furthered by the classifica-
tions employed .... "13 The middle tier has been given a variety 
of descriptive titles-"Demonstrable Basis Theory,"U "Substantial 
in Fact,"15 or "legislative means must substantially further legisla-
tive ends."18 The Court's inquiry under this "new" tier is whether 
the state's "interest is capable of withstanding analysis and that the 
limitation is a reasonable and narrow means of promoting that in-
terest. Thus, the Court has done no more than insure that such 
rights are not limited arbitrarily."17 Rather than attribute a consti-
tutionally valid purpose to the legislation, the Court scrutinizes the 
legislation to see if it actually bears a substantial relationship to the 
legislative purposes. IS 
2. United States v. O'Brien: Incidental Burdens on First 
Amendment Rights 
Governmental regulations of specific conduct that affect speech 
protected by the First Amendment have been upheld by the Court. 
In United States v. O'Brien,tB the Supreme Court concluded that 
where "speech" and "non-speech" elements of conduct were com-
bined, an overriding governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element would justify an incidental burden on the speech 
notwithstanding the guarantees of the First Amendment. 2o In effect, 
the Court removes the legislation from a strict scrutiny analysis 
under equal protection, and imposes a rationale that investigates 
the alleged burden placed upon protected speech. O'Brien was con-
victed under a statute that prohibited destruction of Selective Ser-
13 The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 41, 124 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
1973 Term]. 
" Nowak, supra note 10, at 1071. This process involves review of the asserted end of the 
legislation, as well as the means by which it furthers that end. 
15 Id. at 1081; 1973 Term, supra note 13, at 124. The Court inquires whether there is a 
factual substantiation that the legislative objective is rationally furthered by the legislative 
means selected. 
" Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward, In Search of an Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972). 
11 Nowak, supra note 10, at 1092. 
" Gunther, supra note 16, at 20. 
" 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In support of the validity of the ordinance, the district court majority 
and circuit court dissent in American Mini relied on the criteria set forth in O'Brien. 
2. Id. at 376. 
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vice draft cards. In a public rally to publicize his views of the Viet-
nam War, he burned his draft card. O'Brien later claimed that 
prosecution for such activity was unconstitutional as an abridge-
ment of his freedom of expression and that his act was protected as 
"symbolic speech." The Court, however, did not agree and upheld 
O'Brien's conviction for destruction of his draft card, an act which 
frustrated the substantial government interest in an efficiently 
managed Selective Service System, an interest unrelated to pro-
tected free speech. 
In arriving at their conclusion, the Court propounded a four-part 
test to determine whether a government regulation, infringing on 
the First Amendment, may be removed from strict judicial scrutiny. 
The criteria set forth were: 
1) is it within the constitutional power of the government to 
enact the regulation; 
2) does the enactment of the regulation further an important or 
substantial governmental interest; 
3) is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and 
4) is the incidental burden on alleged First Amendment free-
doms no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est. 21 
The Court specifically found that the 0 'Brien case was unlike a 
case "where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct 
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly inte-
gral to the conduct itself is thought to be harmful."22 The statute 
in 0 'Brien on its face dealt with conduct having no connection with 
speech. The 0 'Brien test is expressly limited to those instances 
where the aim of the legislation is regulation of conduct and not 
regulation of speech. 
B. The American Mini Decision 
The district, circuit, and Supreme Courts relied in varying de-
grees upon an equal protection analysis as well as a First Amend-
ment approach similar to 0 'Brien. The district court analyzed the 
equal protection claims by applying the strict scrutiny standard, 
demanding a finding that the ordinances furthered a compelling 
21 [d. at 377. 
" [d. at 382 (emphasis added). 
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state interest. 23 The court relied upon an affidavit filed by a sociolo-
gist that suggested that a concentration of adult establishments led 
to neighborhood deterioration. The affidavit, in part, read: 
If people believe something is true, even it it is not originally, they 
will tend to act as if it were true, and in so doing help produce the 
condition that originally was only believed. If residents of any neighbor-
hood believe that the concentration of the proscribed uses damage the 
neighborhood, they will act as if it were true and will seek to move away 
and allow in people with different standard; they will allow the property 
to decline . . . .24 
The district court concluded that the affidavit "clearly" established 
the "destructive impact" of adult establishments. Therefore, the 
ordinances were necessary to promote the compelling state interest 
of neighborhood preservation and were non-violative of the equal 
protection clause.25 
In addition, the district court found that the Detroit zoning ordi-
nances did not offend First Amendment rights. Referring to the 
criteria in 0 'Brien, the court concluded that the ordinances at issue 
merely regulated conduct, namely the location of "certain" theaters 
and bookstores.26 In the court's view, the government's interest, the 
preservation and stabilization of neighboorhoods, was an interest 
23 Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1974) , rev'd sub nom. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Young 
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
2. Brief for the Respondent at 5-6, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). Additional affidavits filed included those of a real estate appraiser, owners of a 
commercial enterprise where adult establishments began to operate, a journalist noting the 
decline of neighborhoods in New York City and resultant increases in crime and prostitution 
where adult entertainment congregated, and the chief planner of the Detroit City Planning 
Commission. Id. at 10-19. 
2' Note that under the strict scrutiny test, neighborhood preservation was found to be a 
"compelling state interest." In the past, only two classifications had met this test in the 
Supreme Court under the most rigorous review. See note 10, supra. The district court, how-
ever, did not sustain the city's justification for a prohibition of adult theaters within 500 feet 
of a single dwelling of rooming unit. 
Indeed, . . . we fail to see how the prohibition of the Ordinance affords any protection 
whatsoever to a neighborhood or residential area. We must weigh this imperceptible 
benefit to the City's stated interest against the severe impact imposed by the Ordinance 
on the plaintiffs,. . . while such an extreme effect might not render the restriction invalid 
under the Equal Protection clause if the City had demonstrated that its compelling inter-
est was promoted thereby, no such showing has here been made. 
Norown Theatre, supra note 23, at 369-70. The ordinance was subsequently amended to read 
"residentially zoned districts" in lieu of the single dwelling requirement. Id. 
2' Nortown Theatre, supra note 23, at 370. 
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unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Therefore, as in a 'Brien, 
any burden on First Amendment rights was an incidental by-
product of regulation affecting conduct.27 
The circuit court reversed the district court decision, even though 
the appellate court applied the same standard of equal protection 
scrutiny as the lower court. 28 In arriving at a result contrary to 
the district court, the circuit court stated that when classifications 
substantially burden the First Amendment, the government bears 
a heavy burden of justification, not dismissed by simply establish-
ing that the ordinances served a compelling public interest. Since 
First Amendment "fundamental" rights were at stake, "the City 
had the further burden of showing that the method which it chose 
to deal with the problem at hand was necessary and that its effects 
on protected rights [were] only incidental."29 The city's object of 
neighborhood preservation may have been accomplished by regulat-
ing the location for movie theaters on a basis neutral to the content 
of the films displayed or the city may have validly required that 
theaters be operated only during certain hours. The court con-
cluded, however, that the Detroit ordinance went further than con-
stitutionally permissible by regulating a specific commercial busi-
ness "solely by reference to the content of the constitutionally pro-
tected materials which they purvey to the public."sO 
The circuit court did not find that the ordinances were merely an 
incidental burden of First Amendment rights. Regardless of the 
alleged purpose of the zoning ordinances, their effect was to estab-
lish a means to regulate particular films and books which had not 
been declared obscene. The dissent, however, relied on the O'Brien 
rationale reaching a conclusion similar to that of the lower court.S! 
Justice Stevens delivered the plurality opinion of the Supreme 
Court, in which Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Powell concurred. Four of the five Justices, 
comprising the plurality, relied on an equal protection rationale. 
Justice Powell, however, relied on the broad zoning power of the city 
and a substantive First Amendment O'Brien rationale. He expressly 
disagreed with the plurality analysis of the equal protection issue.s2 
27 [d. at 371. 
28 Gribbs, supra note 3, at 1018. 
" [d. at 1020. 
30 [d. 
31 [d. at 1021 (Celebreeze, J., dissenting). 
32 427 U.S. 50. Justice Powell rejected the equal protection analysis. 
I do not think we need reach, nor am I inclined to agree with, the holding in Part III (and 
supporting discussion) that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under 
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In reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court did not clearly 
articulate the standard of equal protection invoked. Justice Stevens' 
opinion refers to a "factual basis" in the record before the court 
which he suggests substantiates the causal connection between 
neighborhood blight and a concentration of "regulated uses" such 
as "adult" entertainment.33 Presumably, his reliance rested on the 
affidavits which stressed the "deleterious effects" ofthe adult estab-
lishments in question. However, whether or not these affidavits 
demonstrated the necessary "empirical link"34 between neighbor-
hood blight and adult entertainment did not seen to be an impor-
tant factor in the Court's determination, since the Court's opinion 
First Amendment principles from other forms of protected expression. I do not consider 
the conclusions in Part I of the opinion to depend on distinctions between protected 
speech. 
[d. at 73 n.1. 
33 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). 
34 California v. Larue, 409 U.S. 109, 131 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Theater owner 
respondents claimed on a number of bases that reliance on the affidavits filed was misplaced 
and unjustified because the conclusions drawn were based on people's fears and apprehen-
sions that caused them to act in accordance with latent prejudices. In effect any resulting 
neighborhood blight was the product of a "self-fulfilling prophecy." Brief for the Respondent 
at 10-11. Note, however, the Court's statement in a similar case: "[I]n our system, undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom 
of expression." Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972), citing Tinker v. 
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). The affidavit of the real estate appraiser, 
submitted by Respondents, stated: 
. . . many factors which have tended to, and will continue to, reduce property values in 
the City of Detroit, including racial and socioeconomic changes in neighborhoods, real 
estate financing, crime, city income tax, a defunct school system, etc; that it cannot be 
said that the establishment of an adult bookstore or theater either has or will destroy a 
neighborhood or the values of the property therein ... [affiant] state[d] that he has 
studied available data concerning sales of property in one of the areas of Detroit in which 
adult theaters and bookstores have located, and concludes that residental values in the 
neighborhoods have increased over the past two to two and a half years. 
Brief for the Respondent at 17-18, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
Empirical research funded by the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography did not find a 
causal connection between pornography and crime. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY 
AND PORNOGRAPHY, 73 (1970) concluded that patrons of adult bookstores exhibit the following 
profile: White, middle-aged, middle class, male, dressed in business suit or near casual attire, 
shopping alone, manifest great deal of upward socioeconomic mobility, high level occupa-
tions. Brief for the Respondent at 58-59, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50, (1976), citing, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 73 (1970). See, 
California v. Larue, 409 U.S. 109, 131 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall 
discusses the absence of the necessary "empirical link" between bars that serve liquor and 
the high incidence of crime, prostitution, indecent exposure, and rape. Although physical and 
operational characteristics of adult theaters and bookstores as well as other commercial 
establishments may contribute to neighborhood blight and actual deterioration, legislation 
limiting business hours or aimed at improving the physical condition and appearance of 
buildings would offer a more satisfactory solution. Brief for the Respondent at 64, Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
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summarized the situation by noting that, "the city [of Detroit] 
must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solu-
tions to admittedly serious problems."35 
The Court treated the bookstores and theaters as any other eco-
nomic enterprise, ignoring the presence of a fundamental right, the 
freedom of speech, and applied the least rigorous standard of equal 
protection review.3s The Court did not investigate any alternatives 
less restrictive of the First Amendment; nor was sufficient attention 
paid to the contradictory evidence indicating that the presence of 
adult entertainment may not be a cause of neighborhood decline. 37 
Perhaps, any justification offered by the city of Detroit in this case 
would have been sustained by the Court as a means of preventing 
neighborhood deterioration. 
III. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: A RADICAL DEPARTURE 
FROM SETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. offered the Court an op-
portunity to clarify the constitutional standard of review in content-
discrimination cases. A series of cases, raising similar issues to those 
posed in American Mini, provided ample precedent for decision. 
The Court, however, departed from the principles of these cases and 
confused the area of content-discrimination. 
A. The Presumptive Validity of the Zoning Power: Zoning and 
Equal Protection 
The Supreme Court in American Mini relied heavily on the city's 
35 427 U.S. at 71. Cf. The zoning classification upheld in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U.S. 1 (1974) was found to bear a "rational relationship to a [permissible] state objec-
tive." [d. at 8, citing, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The Court in Belle Terre, however, 
did not find that fundamental rights were involved, and therefore minimal scrutiny was 
invoked. The fundamental rights at stake in American Mini, like those at stake in Mosley, 
required a stricter judicial scrutiny that the interests found by the Court in Belle Terre. See 
note 56, infra. 
31 Railway Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Dimiel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). All of these 
cases upheld economic regulations. See, City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently 
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitu-
tionality of the statutory discrimination and require only that the classification challenged 
by rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . In short, the judiciary may not 
sit as a superiegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability oflegislative policy determina-
tions made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines. 
[d. at 303. (emphasis added). 
37 See note 35, supra. 
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need to experiment with methods designed to preserve and stabilize 
neighborhoods. This reliance on the city's justification is at least 
partially due to the long established presumption of validity attrib-
uted to local zoning ordinances. Land use regulation and urban 
planning have historically been given broad recognition by the Su-
preme Court.3S The broad scope of the zoning power is derived from 
the municipality's police power.3U As legislative acts, zoning ordi-
nances are presumptively valid "despite the fact that, in practice, 
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will 
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it."40 
This broad deference to local zoning was clearly evidenced by the 
Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,4J in which the 
Court considered an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, did not find that 
fundamental rights were at stake. Consequently, he applied the 
equal protection standard of "a rational relationship to a [permis-
sible] state objective."42 The decision in Belle Terre broadened 
the goals of the municipalities' police power to include "[a] quiet 
place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles re-
stricted .... " These goals "are legitimate guidelines in a land-use 
project addressed to family needs."43 
Justice Marshall's dissent in Belle Terre focused on the level of 
equal protection scrutiny applied by the court. The ordinances, he 
concluded, burdened fundamental rights of association and privacy 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore 
demanded the stricter tier of equal protection analysis.44 Although 
a city must be given substantial latitude in the area of zoning, 
judicial "deference does not mean abdication. [The] Court has an 
obligation to ensure that zoning ordinances, even when adopted in 
furtherance of such legitimate aims, do not infringe upon constitu-
tional rights."45 He concluded that the ordinance could withstand 
38 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). "If the validity of the 
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be allowed to control." ld. at 388. 
30 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The police power is derived from the Tenth 
Amendment. "Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals,. and health of a community, 
comes within its scope." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876). 
'" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). 
" 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
" ld. at 8, citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
'" ld. at 9 . 
.. ld. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The level of scrutiny applied in equal protection 
rationale is discussed at II A. 1 supra. 
" ld. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the stricter constitutional scrutiny only upon proof that the burden 
on fundamental rights was necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest.48 
Two important considerations that bear heavily upon a proper 
analysis of American Mini are clear from the Belle Terre decision. 
The Court reaffirmed the long standing presumptive validity of 
local land use legislation. Courts do not fashion themselves as 
zoning appeals boards and when possible will defer to the locality's 
judgment. This consideration was clearly recognized by the Su-
preme Court in American Mini. 
However, equally implicit from the Belle Terre decision is a recog-
nition of the proper standard of equal protection scrutiny. The level 
of equal protection scrutiny was not reduced because of the presence 
of the zoning power. Rather, the Court's failure to find funda-
mental rights in Belle Terre justified the minumum tier of judicial 
scrutiny. Had fundamental rights been present, similar to the First 
Amendment rights at stake in American Mini, the Court in Belle 
Terre would have undoubtedly invoked the stricter standard of scru-
tiny.47 Yet, unpredictably, in American Mini, when faced with in-
fringement of constitutionally protected rights, the Court deferred 
quite willingly to the municipality's need to experiment in the area 
of neighborhood preservation.48 
B. Precedent for Decision in Cases of Content-Discrimination 
1. Mosley: Equality of Status in the Field of Ideas 
Although American Mini provided a novel context for a content-
discrimination issue,48 discrimination based upon particular types 
of speech had been presented to the Supreme Court on a number of 
~. [d. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that the legislative goal 
of keeping residential areas free of noise, control of population density, prevention of traffic 
and parking problems, preservation of the rent structure of the community, and aesthetic 
value to the residents were all legitimate gllvernmental interests. However, the legislative 
means were both underinclusive and overinclusive and there were alternate means, less 
burdensome on protected rights, of achieving the same goal. [d. at 19-20 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Compare with Young v .. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring); Gribbs, supra note 3, at 1020; California v. Larue, 409 U.S. 109, 
135 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). 
~. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). 
" [d. at 50. This was the first case in which the interests in free expression protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been implicated by a municipality's zoning ordi-
nance. [d. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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occasions. 5o In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,51 the Court 
considered a Chicago ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 
150 feet of school buildings, exempting all peaceful, labor picketing 
from this total prohibition. Respondent Mosley had picketed a local 
school for a number of months before the ordinance was enacted, 
alleging that the school practiced racial discrimination. The ordi-
nance prohibited picketing against non-labor issues, such as racial 
discrimination, but permitted picketing in labor-related protests. 
Finding that the ordinance treated some forms of speech differ-
ently from others, the Court rested its rationale on an equal protec-
tion analysis, although the issue was "closely intertwined" with the 
First Amendment. The Court concluded that the government could 
not selectively exclude speakers from a public forum based on refer-
ence to content alone.52 Finding that there is an "equality of status 
in the field of ideas," the Court held that the First Amendment and 
the equal protection clause required the government to afford all 
points of view an opportunity to be heard.53 
Although the city asserted that the legislative motive was to pre-
vent school disruption, a substantial and legitimate state interest, 54 
no proof was offered that peaceful labor picketing was any less dis-
ruptive than peaceful non-labor picketing. The city argued that as 
a class, non-labor picketing was more prone to violence. The Court, 
however, refused to accept "[p]rediction~ about imminent disrup-
tion[s] ... "55 and rejected the city's justifi~ation. 
50 Neimotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1963); 
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring); Kalven, The Concept of 
the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (1965). Professor Kalven wrote on 
the emergence of equal protection analysis in content classification cases: 
If some groups are exempted from a prohibition on parades and pickets, the rationale for 
regulation is fatally impeached. The objection can then no longer be keyed to interferences 
with other users of the public places, but would appear to implicate the kind of message 
that the groups were transmitting. The regulation would thus slip from the neutrality of 
time, place and circumstances into a concern about content. The result is that equal 
protection analysis in the area of speech issues would merge with considerations of censor-
ship. 
Id. at 29. 
II 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
'2 Id. at 96. Access to a public forum is discussed at III B.2, infra. 
'"Id . 
•• Id. at 99-100 . 
.. Id. at 100-01. Predictions about imminent disruptions from picketing involve judg-
ments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifica-
tions, especially those based on subject matter. Freedom of expression, and its intersection 
with a guarantee of equal protection, would rest on a soft foundation indeed if government 
could distinguish among picketers on such a wholesale and categorical basis. 
Id. at 100-01. 
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In applying an equal protection standard of "careful scrutinY,"58 
the Court found that where the First Amendment is involved, gov-
ernmentallegislation must be narrowly drawn so that fundamental 
rights are not curtailed. Thus, in Mosley, although the city claimed 
a substantial state interest, the selective restrictions on expression 
were found to be far greater intrusions of protected speech than were 
necessary. 57 
The Supreme Court in American Mini did not attempt to distin-
guish Mosley.58 The dissent in the American Mini circuit court opin-
ion59 had attempted, albeit unconvincingly, to distinguish the two 
cases, and found that Mosley was not controlling because that city 
ordinance did not merely regulate the right to picket, but rather 
"was an absolute ban on picketing near schools, unless the picketing 
was labor-related."80 Mosley, however, cannot be distinguished on 
that ground alone. In American Mini, the ordinance also was an 
absolute ban on the location of theaters and bookstores within speci-
fied areas, if the theaters exhibited the proscribed material. The 
., In a footnote to the majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court refers to the standard of scrutiny applied to the Mosley 
ordinance. "The stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the ordinance was 
one 'affecting First Amendment interests.''' 411 U.S. at 34, n.75. The Court's analysis in 
Rodriguez illustrates why commentators have had difficulty in pinpointing the Court's stan-
dards of review in the Equal Protection area. In dissent, Justice Marshall lamented that the 
Court attempted to stratify the categories of Equal Protection analysis. However, in his view, 
Supreme Court decisions resting upon Equal Protection rationale applied a sliding scale of 
standards. Id. at 98-99. 
57 At least one commentator has hailed Mosley as a landmark First Amendment decision. 
[Mosley) makes two principal points: 1) the eBSence of the First Amendment is its denial 
to government of the power to determine which messages shall be heard and which sup-
preBBed; . . . 2) Any 'time, place and manner' restriction that selectively excludes speak-
ers from a public forum must survive careful judicial scrutiny to insure that the exclusion 
is the minimum necessary to further a significant government interest. . . The Court has 
explicitly adopted the principle of equal liberty of expreBBion. 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 28 
(1975) . 
.. The Court attempted to distinguish Mosley by a discuBBion of the use of content analysis 
in the inapposite area of defamation. The Court concluded that implicit in their holdings is 
the assumption that the content of the news article determines the quantum of First Amend-
ment protections. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976). However, 
the subject matter of an article is determinative only of the standard of proof that the 
complainant carries. The American Mini Court itself, noted that "although the content of a 
story must be examined to decide whether it involves a public figure or a public issue, the 
Court's application of the relevant rule may not depend on its favorable or unfavorable 
appraisal of that figure or that issue." 1d. at 67 (emphasis added). Therefore, even in the 
area of defamation, the Court will not permit content valuations to be considered. See note 
104, infra . 
.. Gribbs, supra note 3, at 1021 (Celebreeze, J., diBBenting) . 
.. 1d. at 1024. 
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basis for this distinction between "adult" theaters and all other 
theaters was the fear that such speech concentrated in one geo-
graphical area would lead to a deterioration of surrounding neigh-
borhoods. Both the Mosley ordinance and the ordinances at issue in 
American Mini effectively singled out particular forms of speech for 
regulation in some manner and therefore were not content-neutral 
in their application.6! Additionally, the Mosley Court was unwil-
ling to accept the "[p]redictions about imminent disruption[s]"62 
that might result from non-labor picketing, whereas the Court in 
American Mini clearly accepted the speculative causal connection 
between concentrations of adult entertainment and neighborhood 
deterioration.63 Clearly, the Mosley precedent prohibiting selective 
exclusion of speech precluded the enactment of the American Mini 
zoning ordinance, which differentiated among movie theaters and 
bookstores solely upon the content of the material sold. 
2. Lehman: An Aberration in the Area of Content-Discrimination 
The Mosley mandate against excluding communication based on 
content was ignored by the Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights. 64 Petitioner Lehman challenged a policy of the municipal 
rapid transit system that allowed commercial, but denied political 
advertising. Lehman, a candidate for political office, argued that 
the city of Shaker Heights, by accepting commercial advertising, 
had opened a public forum, and therefore space had to be granted 
in a nondiscriminatory manner to noncommercial advertising. The 
plurality opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, found that the city 
was engaged in a commercial venture and that it was within their 
discretion and business judgment to treat advertising space as 
they wished. He viewed the city's policy as similar to a municipal 
decision to charge "a 10-, 25-, or 35-cent fare," or to change 
schedules and locations of bus stopS.85 
The plurality in Lehman rested their decision upon their failure 
to find a public forum. In their view, advertising space on public 
" Justice Stevens' analysis starts from the premise that the zoning ordinance was a content 
classification, not a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation as Justice Powell, in 
his concurring opinion, viewed the ordinance. 
" Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972). 
" Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). See text at notes 98-101, 
infra. 
a< 418 U.S. 298 (1974) . 
.. [d. at 304. 
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transportation did not represent an implied acquiescence on the 
part of the city to afford access to all potential advertisers. The 
Court's unwillingness to find a public forum may have been based 
on a number of considerations. First, the Court viewed the leasing 
of advertising space as a proprietary activity. Under this rationale, 
the Court concluded that business judgment may have dictated the 
exclusion of political ads. The plurality opinion surmised that polit-
ical advertising was not as revenue-productive as commercial adver-
tising, due to the "short term candidacy or issue-oriented advertise-
ment."66 
The Court's assumption in Lehman that the politician's claim did 
not "rise to the dignity of a First Amendment violation, "87 may have 
been influenced by the Court's approach to advertising in general. 
Traditionally the Court has not afforded "commercial speech" the 
same protections given to other forms of speech.68 Commercial 
speech, like advertising, is speech that "[does] no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction."69 The fact that the politician in 
Lehman framed his claim as a right of access to advertise may' have 
accounted for the Court's willingness to find that his constitutional 
rights were not denied. 
An additional basis for the Lehman decision was elaborated in 
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion. Consonant with his reverence 
for the sanctity of the human environment,7° Justice Douglas 
equated advertising on a public transport with the obtrusiveness of 
highway billboards. 71 Rather than consider the constitutional right 
of access claimed by the politic an, Justice Douglas rested his deci-
sion on the constitutional right of commuters to be free from forced 
intrusions upon their privacy. He found that bus commuters were a 
"captive audience," unable to exercise the choice of exposure to the 
speech. In his view, "the right of the commuters to be free from 
forced intrusions on their privacy preclude[ d] the city from trans-
... [d, 
" [d, 
.. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Citizens, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
recently decided that commercial speech does not lose its First Amendment protection be-
cause money is spent to convey it to the public. The corollary to this holding would provide 
that commercial speech, although entitled to some First Amendment protection, is still 
regarded as a lesser category than other forms of protected speech . 
.. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973). 
,. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954). 
71 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 306 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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forming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the 
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience."72 Justice Doug-
las failed to distinguish the obvious intrusions of commercial adver-
tising, yet he recognized that such displays would be as offensive as 
political ads. However, that issue could not, in his view, be decided 
by the Court since no party was before the Court claiming an inva-
sion of privacy.73 
Neither Justice Blackmun nor Justice Douglas viewed the content 
of the message in Lehman as relevant to the political candidate's 
access to the forum. Justice Brennan's dissent, however, focused on 
the content-discrimination issue. Because the city accepted com-
mercial advertising, Justice Brennan concluded that they had vol-
untarily established a public forum,74 and "[ o]nce a public forum 
has been established, both free speech and Equal Protection princi-
ples prohibit discrimination based solely upon subject matter or 
content."75 Justice Brennan felt that the principle enunciated by the 
Court in Mosley, "equality of status in the field of ideas," should 
have been controlling on the issue. Brennan would have required 
that the Court subject the city's decision to strict scrutiny under 
equal protection analysis. With this test, the city would have been 
required to demonstrate that its discretionary classifications 
furthered a substantial governmental interest. Because the munici-
pality's decision to exclude particular speech was based solely upon 
subject matter or content, the dissent would have invalidated the 
policy under equal protection analysis. 
Although Mosley and Lehman clearly presented similar issues of 
discrimination based upon content of speech, the plurality's failure 
in Lehman to find a public forum led to contrary results in the two 
cases. Had the Court in Lehman accepted the political candidate's 
claim that a public forum had indeed been created, the precedent 
established in Mosley, militating against content-discrimination, 
would likely have been applied. The competing interest of a 
"captive audience" and the nonexistence of a public forum were 
not issues in American Mini. The Detroit zoning ordinances were 
not directed at preventing the invasion of allegedly offensive com-
72 [d. at 307. There was neither a captive audience nor an invasion of privacy issue in 
American Mini, although the city raised these issues for the first time in their brief before 
the Supreme Court. Brief for the Respondent at 80, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 
427 U.S. 50 (1976). See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
73 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
7' [d. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7. [d. at 315. Justice Brennan relied upon the Mosley precedent for this conclusion. 
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munication upon a public unable to avoid exposure.76 Additionally, 
a public forum existed in the American Mini case as theaters and 
bookstores are public places. Both the plurality and dissent in Leh-
man agreed that if a public forum had been established, equal pro-
tection and First Amendment precedent would preclude discrimina-
tion solely upon the subject matter of the materialY 
3. Erznoznik: Application of Strict Judicial Scrutiny to 
Legislative Exclusion of Offensive Speech 
Rather than clarify the inconsistencies of Mosley and Lehman, 
and resolve the ambiguous standard of review prevailing in content-
discrimination cases, the Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville78 prolonged the confusion. Erznoznik applied both strict 
scrutiny under equal protection rationale and a substantive First 
Amendment analysis that considered privacy interests and the 
presence of a captive audience. In Jacksonville, Florida, an ordi-
nance declared that drive-in theaters exhibiting films containing 
nudity would be a public nuisance if the movie screen was visible 
from a public street or place. The city maintained that public dis-
plays of nudity could be suppressed as a protection of the privacy 
interests of the community. The Court refused to accept such justi-
fications and found the ordinance unconstitutional. 
Justice Powell, writing the majority opinion in Erznoznik, agreed 
that privacy interests may be protected and may override the indi-
vidual's right to speech by content-neutral regulations.79 The Court 
concluded, however, that the First Amendment prohibited discrimi-
natory treatment based on the substance of speech unless out-
weighed by the countervailing interests of a captive audience or the 
privacy of individuals.80 Although the ordinance was not a total 
suppression or restraint of free expression, the Court recognized its 
deterrent effects on protected speech.81 
" Brief for the Respondent at 80, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), discussed at III B.3, infra. 
71 Brief for the Respondent at 54, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). 
78 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
" [d. at 209 . 
.. For the "captive audience" concept see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 
(1974) discussed in text at notes 64-73, supra. 
" The deterrent manifested itself in two ways. Theaters would have to incur great financial 
expense if protective fencing was required for drive-ins. Second, theaters would be deterred 
from exhibiting any film that contained a fleeting glimpse of nudity, however innocent. See 
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A clearer application of equal protection analysis was prompted 
by the city's asserted justification that nudity on a drive-in screen 
acted as a distraction to passing motorists, causing an increase in 
accidents. Referring to Mosley, the Court found this classification 
underinclusive, as all outdoor theaters were potential traffic distrac-
tions to passing motorists. Furthermore, the city could offer no rea-
son for the distinction drawn between the distractive nature of nud-
ity on drive-in theaters as opposed to all other films.82 
Significantly, the Court in Erznoznik subjected the ordinance to 
strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis. In cases where mini-
mum scrutiny under equal protection analysis is invoked, the 
Court may uphold some classifications in order to further a legisla-
tive priority. However, the Court in Erznoznik was unwilling to 
accept the speculative necessity for the disparate treatment ac-
corded nudity on drive-in screens, and found that First Amendment 
interests required strict judicial scrutiny.83 
IV. THE American Mini DECISION: CURTAILMENT OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Only an uncritical eye would overlook the Court's apparent dis-
taste for the material involved in American Mini and the Court's 
resultant departure from First Amendment and equal protection 
principles. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley84 considered the 
problem of discrimination based upon content of speech and held 
that the First Amendment as well as the equal protection clause 
prohibited censorship based upon the subject matter of unfavorable 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88-91 (1976) (Blackmum, J., dissenting); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). The fact that Petitioners could 
exhibit their production in another theater in the city did not alleviate the prior restraint on 
protected speech; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) "Vagueness and [its) 
attendant evils ... are not rendered less objectionable because the regulation of expression 
is one of classification rather than direct suppression." Id. at 688. Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
" The Court offered as a solution a nondiscriminatory regulation requiring all drive-in 
theaters to fence the view from passing motorists. One commentator has suggested that equal 
protection analysis in this area would allow a municipality to broaden the scope of its legisla-
tion, covering all aspects of a problem, rather than a narrow piece of legislation, less restric-
tive on the First Amendment. Note, Equal But Inadequate Protection: A Look at Mosley and 
Grayned, 8 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS - CIV. LIB. L. REV. 464 (1973). However, if such result did oc-
cur, an equal protection claim might rest on the basis of the overinclusive nature of the 
legislation. See Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341 (1949); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
" The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 128 (1975). 
" 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
120 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:101 
speech. Although the Mosley precedent was ignored in Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights,8S it was the absence of a public forum and 
the presence of a captive audience that distinguished the Court's 
conclusion in Lehman. Erznaznik v. City of Jacksanville88 presented 
the Court with a similar factual situation as that posed in American 
Mini. In Erznaznik, the Court refused to validate a legislative pre-
rogative designed to curtail unpopular speech. The Court found that 
the speech was protected by the First Amendment and applied 
strict judicial scrutiny under an equal protection rationale. 
Erznaznik suggests that the Court in American Mini should have 
evaluated the Detroit ordinance under a strict scrutiny standard. 
Consistent with Mosley, the Detroit ordinance should have been 
struck down as an example of impermissible content-discrimi-
nation. The American Mini Court effectively ignored the teachings 
of Erznaznik and Mosley. 
The plurality opinion in American Mini embarked on several dif-
ferent routes to arrive at the conclusion that the Detroit zoning 
ordinance was constitutionally permissible. Each rationale is per-
plexing, leaving future analysis of equal protection and First 
Amendment problems uncertain. The Court's statement "that so-
ciety's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammelled 
political debate,"87 is constitutionally unfounded. "Much speech 
that seems to be of little or no value will enter the market place of 
ideas, threatening the quality of our social discourse and, more gen-
erally, the serenity of our lives. But that is the price to be paid for 
constitutional freedom."88 It is the duty of the Court not to act as a 
censor of speech protected by the First Amendment. 
When fundamental rights are legislatively classified, the Court 
has explicitly required a high degree of judicial scrutiny. Non-
obscene protected speech receives full First Amendment protec-
tion. R9 As a fundamental right, the interest curtailed in American 
Mini required strict judicial scrutiny under equal protection analy-
sis. Only upon a finding of a compelling state interest should the 
Detroit ordinances have been validated. One can only attribute the 
" 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
" 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
" Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
" [d. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
" E.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jackson· 
ville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1972). See note 5, 
supra. 
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Court's rashness in relinquishing settled constitutional principles to 
personal repugnance for the material claiming protection. 
Unlike Lehman, American Mini did not present the issues of a 
public forum or a captive audience. Detroit citizens were not "cap-
tive," as they were capable at all times of avoiding any alleged inva-
sion of their privacy.9o One is not forced to enter an adult theater 
or peruse the merchandise of an adult bookstore. 
The asserted motive for the Detroit legislation was the prevention 
of neighborhood deterioration. In large part, the alleged deteriora-
tion was no more than the commercial residents' perception and 
prediction of the consequences of adult establishments.91 Although 
unwilling to accept such a forecast in Mosley, the Court comfortably 
rested its decision in American Mini on the city's need to experi-
ment in the area of zoning. Although the police power has been 
given an almost unlimited rein by the Court, "it is equally well 
established that the police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the 
passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter to the limitations 
of the Federal Constitution."92 
Although Justice Powell in his American Mini concurring opinion 
rejected the plurality's contention that non-obscene, erotic material 
justified different treatment under the First Amendment,93 his anal-
ysis is subject to criticism. Justice Powell distinguished Erznoznik 
and American Mini by stating that the former was a direct attempt 
at suppression of speech, while in American Mini, the legislation 
had only an indirect effect on speech. By analyzing American Mini 
under the criteria set forth in United States v. O'Brien, he con-
cluded that the Detroit zoning ordinance was a regulation of con-
duct, not of speech. 
O'Brien, however, may not even be applicable to the issue pre-
sented in American Mini. It was conceded by the Detroit Common 
Council that it was the results of particular speech that prompted 
the promulgation of the "adult" zoning ordinance.94 "[T]he City's 
.. The City of Detroit seemingly would have the power to regulate outside displays of 
"adult" theatres and bookstores on the basis of its interest and responsibility for the well-
being of minors. See Ginsberg v. State of New York, 391 U.S. 629, 643 (1968). 
" See text at note 24, supra and note 33, supra . 
• 2 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917). 
" See note 32, supra. 
" Brief for the Petitioners at 22-23, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976). 
Even though there is no question that material judicially determined to be obscene may 
be banned there remains the very real problem of controlling the influx of adult businesses 
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principal asserted interest was in minimizing the 'undesirable' ef-
fect of speech having a particular content. "95 The 0 'Brien test is 
applicable only where the government's purpose is to regulate con-
duct. 0 'Brien involved government regulation of conduct which 
only incidentally burdened First Amendments rights. On these lim-
ited facts the legislation was upheld. The O'Brien court distin-
guished the factual situation at issue in that case from one where 
the government's regulation of conduct arose because the communi-
cation integral to the conduct was itself thought to be harmful. 98 
Clearly, the conduct regulated in American Mini, the operation of 
certain theaters and bookstores in specified locations, is integrally 
related to the supposed harmful effects of the "communication" 
occurring at such establishments. The classification, "adult,"97 de-
rived from the content of the books or films, should be evidence 
enough that the intent of the Detroit zoning regulation was to con-
trol the speech aspect of the enterprise, and not the non-speech or 
conduct element of location. Analysis of American Mini under 
o 'Brien was clearly inappropriate. Rather, the issue was similar to 
that presented in Erznoznik and therefore required strict judicial 
scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 
Further, the Court ignored the substantial possibility that the 
Detroit zoning ordinances were enacted as a means to eliminate, on 
a wholesale basis, unpopular, yet protected, First Amendment 
whose stock in trade, whether films, magazines or performances, are entitled to display 
and/or distribution before any judgment may be made as to whether the material offered 
is pornographic. In addition, unless and until the courts rule that the use of an establish-
ment to exhibit or sell obscene press materials or films is abateable as a nuisance, contin-
ued and repeated convictions for disseminating pornographic material will not close those 
business establishments which are the continuing, visible sources of material which is 
offensive to the neighboring business and residential community, whether or not the 
materials have been legally determined to be pornographic. Experience has shown that 
one or more convictions against an establishment does not force its closure, nor does it 
offer any protection to the neighborhood. 
[d. In applying the O'Brien criteria, Justice Powell noted that an intent or purpose to restrict 
the communication itself would make O'Brien inapplicable. 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., 
concurring) . 
" Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) . 
.. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968). 
" The Detroit ordinance explicitly defined the qualities that would characterize an estab-
lishment as "adult." DETROIT, MICH. ORDINANCE 742-G § 32.007 (1972). 
An establishment having as a substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade, books, 
magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by their empha-
sis on matter depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or 
"Specified Anatomical Areas." 
1977] YOUNG V. AMERICAN MINI 123 
speech. Broad regulations,98 such as zoning, can act as a guise for 
the elimination of material not within judicial obscenity standards, 
but which a community finds offensive. Regulations may be enacted 
to evade conformity with such judicial commands and to by-pass 
the often frustrusting, time consuming mechanics of the judicial 
process. 
The brief for the city of Detroit intimated that the courts' failure 
to rule that "adult" material was abateable as a nuisance, interfered 
with the municipality's efforts to control the influx of such material 
prior to a judicial pronouncement that it was obscene and subject 
to suppression.9t However, the specific adult films and books regu-
lated by the Detroit zoning ordinances were never determined to be 
obscene,loo and thus were never removed from the protections of the 
First Amendment. It is submitted that the Court's combined failure 
to countenance this fact and its blind deference to the city's need 
to prevent neighborhood deterioration, is a blatant abdication of 
judicial responsibility to First Amendment protections. 
The Court was willing to find a direct causal connection between 
x-rated entertainment and the problem of neighborhood deteriora-
tion, though such a nexus was never supplied by the city of Detroit. 
The Court in A merican Mini willingly accepted the amorphous 
speculations and conclusions drawn from the sociologist's affida-
vit. IOI Since First Amendment fundamental rights were at stake, 
strict scrutiny under equal protection was required. Using such 
strict analysis, the court would have had to reject the equivocal 
rationalizations offered by the city of Detroit. Where the First 
Amendment is threatened, it is the duty of the Court to demand the 
least restrictive alternative unless it can be conclusively demon-
.. California v. Larue, 409 U.S. 109, 123 (1972). (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
"Indeed there are some indications in the legislative history that California adopted these 
liquor licensing regulations for the specific purpose of evading [obscenity] standards. 
Thus Captain Robert Devin of the Los Angeles Police Department testified that the 
Department found adoption of the new regulations for the following reason: While statu-
tory law has been available to us to regulate what was formerly considered as antisocial 
behavior, the federal and state judicial system has through a series of similar decisions, 
effective emasculated law enforcement in its effort to contain and control the growth of 
pornography and of obscenity and of behavior that is associated with this kind of perform-
ance." [d. at 126 n.4 . 
.. See note 94, supra. 
'00 See note 97, supra. A reading of the definition of "adult" in the Detroit zoning ordi-
nance could include books or films that although within the definitional framework of the 
ordinance were not legally obscene. The Court in Erznoznik found an ordinance with a similar 
impact to be impermissibly overbroad. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
'0' See text at note 24, supra. 
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strated that the protected activity and the resultant conduct are so 
closely intertwined that by regulating one, the other can be elimi-
nated. lo2 
V. CONCLUSION 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. presented the Supreme 
Court with a unique problem. Few would argue that the plight of 
urban areas should go unnoticed by concerned municipal legisla-
tures. Judicial precedent has accorded cities an almost unlimited 
rein in coping with the complexities and problems associated with 
urban growth and expansion. Yet, no right is held more judicially 
sacred than the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The 
Court failed fully to appreciate that the two interests are not mu-
tually exclusive. 
The material regulated by the Detroit ordinances was protected 
speech. There was no determination that the books or films dis-
played at "adult" establishments fell within the unprotected sphere 
of obscenity. The court assumed that non-obscene "adult" material 
was of less intrinsic value to our society and thus entitled to less 
constitutional protection. 
The ramifications of American Mini are unclear.lo3 The Court, in 
yielding to the censorial effects of the Detroit ordinance, has 
adopted gradationslo4 among types of protected speech. Yet the only 
,.2 California v. Larue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
,.3 The American Mini decision has already been implemented in New York. Citing the 
American Mini opinion, the New York City Planning Commission amended the general 
zoning plan on January 26, 1977. The New York amendments went further in restricting adult 
enterprises than their Detroit counterparts by limiting adult uses to specific districts, and 
by subjecting them to distance, concentration, size, and amortization restrictions. New York, 
N.Y. Ordinance 32-461,32-464 (1977). 
The Board of Estimate later voted to postpone further consideration of the zoning ordi-
nances, concerned that the breadth of the amendments may be beyond American Mini 
protection, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1977, p. I, col. 1. 
I.' The Supreme Court has recognized categories of speech which are subject to some 
regulation. However, the Court's reliance on such precedent is not appropriate for the dis-
cussion of the issues presented in American Mini. One area discussed is the limitation on the 
absolute freedom of speech in the context of defamation. However, libel and slander are areas 
of speech that are not accorded the ambit of First Amendment protections, whereas the non-
obscene speech in American Mini is fully protected speech. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 
276 U.S. 254 (1963) and Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1975). 
The Court has recognized that "commercial" speech, although protected, is not accorded 
the full First Amendment guarantees of other forms of speech. Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Consumer Citizens, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). However, the speech in American 
Mini does not fall within the definitional framework of "commercial" speech. Pittsburgh 
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indicia for preference of one form over another is the public's 
"readiness to parade off to war." In effect, the Court has relegated 
the degree of protection afforded speech, to its value in the eyes of 
a majority of the public. This premise is contradictory to the very 
purposes of the First Amendment; those forms of speech that are 
least favored by society require the greatest judicial protection. 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). See notes 
68-69, supra. 
